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Johnston v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (Oct. 6, 2022)1
PRETRIAL RELEASE PROCEDURES CLARIFIED
Summary
A defendant is constitutionally entitled to a prompt hearing after being taken into custody
from pretrial release, and at that hearing, the State bears the burden of demonstrating probable
cause. A violation of a condition of a pretrial release may lead to statutory sanctions, and the
court does not recognize a distinction between so-called “technical” and “substantive” violations.
NRS 178.4851 and Valdez-Jimenez require the district court to make findings of fact on the
record that each condition of pretrial release is the least restrictive means of ensuring public
safety and the defendant’s return to court.
Background
The State charged petitioner Derek Johnston with criminal activity. He was granted bail
and placed on house arrest with pretrial release conditions.
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) then arrested Johnston and
took him into custody for violating his pretrial release conditions. The State moved to revoke
bail. Over one month later, the district court held a hearing on the motion. The district court
temporarily granted the motion pending an evidentiary hearing. A few weeks later, the district
court held an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, Johnston argued that his violation was a
technical violation, not a substantive one. The district court rejected this proposed distinction.
The district court nonetheless reinstated Johnston to house arrest. Johnston requested to be
removed from house arrest. He also argued that house arrest and the pretrial release conditions
that were imposed were not the least restrictive means of ensuring public safety and his return to
court. The district court denied Johnston’s request and did not providing a ruling on whether the
protocol represented the least restrictive means.
LVMPD arrested Johnston and took him into custody for a second time for violating
other pretrial release conditions. No hearing on Johnston’s detention was scheduled. However, at
a calendar call hearing, Johnston sought his release from custody. He objected that the State was
required to move to detain him. Despite Johnston’s objection, the district court directed Johnston
to move for his release. The district court did not address his custody status. After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court ordered Johnston’s release. The district court also ordered his
reinstatement to house arrest.
Johnston filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the pretrial release
procedures.
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Discussion
Johnston’s challenges relating to the procedures for addressing violations of the
pretrial release terms are moot
Johnston challenges the procedures for addressing the alleged violations of his pretrial
release conditions. The court’s role is to resolve live disputes, not moot or abstract issues. 2 There
are however recognized exceptions.3 Johnston is no longer in custody. His claims challenging his
detention are therefore moot. The court must determine whether an exception exists.
The moot claims should be considered as presenting issues capable of repetition, yet
evading review
Johnston argues that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception applies. He
argues that most detentions of this nature are short and that the issues concerning such a
detention become moot once the case is eventually resolved. He contends that these issues
regularly recur, citing three other criminal cases. He claims that these detention issues involve
violations of due process. The court may consider a moot case “if it involves a matter of
widespread importance that is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”4 For this exception to
apply, the party must show “that (1) the duration of the challenged action is relatively short, (2)
there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future, and (3) the matter is important.” 5
Here, the exception applies. First, the duration of the challenged detention is short. Therefore, it
is unlikely that the detainee could have a constitutional claim decided before release or
conviction.6 Second, it is likely that these issues will arise in the future. The cases cited by
Johnston suggest this is so, and Johnston himself has twice been detained in this manner. Third,
pretrial detention affects many arrestees, and the constitutionality of pretrial release procedures is
at issue.
Mandamus relief is warranted in part, and this petition presents several important legal
issues that merit clarification
The questions here are of statewide importance. The court grants mandamus relief in part
to direct the district court to make findings of fact on the record consistent with NRS 178.4851.7
The court grants advisory mandamus in part to clarify the law on pretrial release procedures.8
Due process requires a prompt hearing for a defendant taken into custody while on
house arrest for a pretrial release violation, at which the State must show probable
cause
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Johnston argues that he was deprived of his right to due process by being held in custody
for over a month without a hearing. He argues that he was entitled to a prompt hearing. The State
argues that no hearing is required because such a detention is not a new arrest. The federal and
state constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of
law.9 For due process, the timing of a hearing is critical.10 NRS 178.4851(7) provides that any
penalty for violating a pretrial release condition must be preceded by notice and a hearing.11 The
statute does not provide specific time limits for conducting the hearing. The court adopts
Johnston’s argument. Here, anyone detained for allegedly violating a pretrial release condition
has a due process right to a prompt hearing. At the hearing, the State must show probable cause
that a violation has occurred,12 and the defendant may contest the evidence.13 If probable cause is
found, sanctions set out in NRS 178.4851(7)(a)–(c) may be imposed.14 The court rejects the
State’s argument that taking a person into custody does not qualify as an arrest.15 By not holding
a prompt hearing on an alleged pretrial release violation, a district court abuses its discretion.
A violation of house arrest restrictions may justify taking a defendant into custody, and
there is no distinction between “technical” and “substantive” violations
Johnston argues that the language in NRS 178.487 would be rendered surplusage if the
court does not create intermediate levels of sanctions. He proposes adoption of the standard from
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 and NRS 176A.630, which allegedly differentiate between
“technical” and “non-technical” violations. Courts look first to plain language in interpreting a
statute.16 Where legislative intent is clear, courts will construe it to give effect to that intent.17
The plain language of the statutes at issue means that Johnston’s arguments fail. NRS 178.487
does not apply here. NRS 178.4851(7)(c) is the applicable statute, and it does not distinguish
between “technical” and “substantive” violations. NRS 176A.630 does define a “technical
violation.” By contrast, there are no classifications of violations in NRS 178.4851(7). It appears
the Legislature did not intend for Nevada’s bails laws to mirror of the analogous federal laws.
The district court manifestly abused its discretion by failing to enter findings on the
record supporting the conditions of pretrial release that it imposed
Johnston contends that the district court erred because the restrictions that it imposed on
him were not individualized to his circumstances and because he was required to submit to house
arrest. The district court did not make factual findings below. Its order is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.18 NRS 178.4851(1) provides that “the court shall only impose . . . a condition of
release . . . on a person as it deems to be the least restrictive means necessary to protect the safety
of the community or to ensure that the person will appear at all times and places ordered by the
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8(2).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4851(7).
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Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 155, 166, 460 P.3d 976, 987 (2020).
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State v. Knight, 380 A.2d 61, 61 (Vt. 1977).
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See Sheriff Washoe Cnty. v. Steward, 109 Nev. 831, 835, 858 P.2d 48, 51 (1993).
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Id.
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court.”19 The court must support any condition imposed with reasoned findings of fact on the
record.20 The determination must be individualized.21 The district court abused its discretion by
failing to make the required findings when it assigned Johnston to house arrest. The court directs
the district court to make the necessary findings of fact on the record.
Conclusion
The court clarifies three issues of law. First, a defendant has a constitutional right to a
prompt hearing after being taken into custody from pretrial release, and at that hearing, the State
bears the burden of demonstrating probable cause. Second, a violation of a condition of pretrial
release may lead to statutory sanctions, and the Court does not recognize a distinction between
so-called “technical” and “substantive” violations. And third, NRS 178.4851 and Valdez-Jimenez
require the district court to make findings of fact on the record that each condition of pretrial
release is the least restrictive means of ensuring public safety and the defendant’s return to court.
The court grants mandamus relief in part and denies mandamus relief in part.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4851(1).
§ 178.4851(3); see also Valdez-Jimenez, 136 Nev. at 166, 460 P.3d at 987.
See Valdez-Jimenez, 136 Nev. at 164, 460 P.3d at 985.

